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The notion that scientific progress depends on access to the existing stock of
knowledge is an old one. It dates to the 12th century when the French philosopher
Bernard of Chartres observed: “We are like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, so
that we can see more than they, and things at a greater distance, not by virtue
of any sharpness of sight on our part, or any physical distinction, but because
we are carried high and raised up by their giant size.” (John of Salisbury, quoted
in Robert K. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants, 1965, chapter 9, p. 10). And,
famously, Sir Isaac Newton echoed this sentiment in a 1675 letter to Robert Hooke
saying: “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.” (Chaomei
Chen, Mapping Scientific Frontiers, 2013).
It is not surprising, then, that scholars are not universally enthusiastic about for-profit
publishers acting as gatekeepers of knowledge.
As Joshua Gans has pointed out in his terrific book on open access, in “2012 Tim
Gowers – a Fields Medalist in mathematics – wrote a blog post targeting various
practices of Elsevier and calling for a boycott of the academic publisher. Gowers
cited the publisher’s high prices, bundling practices, tough negotiating tactics, and
Elsevier’s support for various public policies.” Similarly, in 2001 economist Ted
Bergstrom pointed to the fact that journals are expensive but draw largely on the free
labor of academics who write and referee the papers, and edit the journals.
“Open access” can be taken to mean many things. But at its core is an ideal of free
or largely-free publishing. In practice it means something quite different. But it is
worth asking what an optimal system might look like. I will analyze this question
from the perspective of an economist, and through the lens of market design. But
before getting to how best to design knowledge markets, some basic economics of
innovation must be discussed.
Economists have formalized this concept, and shown how economic growth more
generally – not merely scientific progress – depends on “ideas”. In the early 1990s
Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt, and Paul Romer pioneered what has become known
as “endogenous growth theory”. This theory emphasized the development of ideas
as a crucial determinant of technological progress.
It is worth pausing briefly to discuss this theory, because it shows why some degree
of market power for some players in the knowledge-generation ecosystem is
valuable. We will return to the question of who should have that market power and
how large it should be.
Romer’s contribution was to highlight that producing ideas has large set-up costs but
potentially low marginal costs of replication. For instance, a pharmaceutical company
may spend a lot of money on research & development, but once that cost has been
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paid producing additional pills is extremely cheap.In order to get a return on this
large investment – and to make the development of new pharmaceuticals viable
– some degree of monopoly power is required. Otherwise other parties who didn’t
invest in developing the new drugs could simply copy them. This is why economists
are generally in favor of government intervention of some sort in these markets –
such as intellectual property rights and subsidies for basic research.
Aghion and Howitt highlighted the role of “creative destruction”.  Namely, that
innovation can render old technologies obsolete, and hence that innovations come
with externalities – costs or benefits for other parties. Romer emphasized the
positive externalities – specifically that ideas are non-rivalrous. A classic example is
that everyone can use Pythagoras’s Theorem now it has been discovered. Aghion
and Howitt focused on the negative externalities – namely that new ideas can
render old ideas obsolete, thereby deterring innovation in the first place. Put another
way, why make a big investment in R&D if future R&D by others will render yours
obsolete?
The answer to this conundrum is that market power protects the rents earned by
innovators.
This all suggests that purely free academic publishing will lead to too little knowledge
generation. A reasonable response to this is that academics aren’t in it for the
money – that they innovate for the love of it, or for recognition and other professional
accolades. This is no doubt true, but it raises the question of whether all the work
academics do in the publication process – writing, refereeing, and editing – put in
the optimal level of effort based on non-pecuniary benefits. In other words, is status
enough?
My own instinct is to answer this in the affirmative, but it is ultimately an empirical
question. But for the remainder of this article, I will assume the answer is “yes”.
This leads us to the question of how to organize the dissemination of knowledge,
assuming that the production of knowledge is a separable question, and that
production is organized efficiently.
Market power in academic publishing
The backdrop against which the open access debate is occurring is well captured
by the interventions of Bergstrom and Gowers. It might be roughly put this way:
Academics do all the work in the knowledge ecosystem, why don’t they get all the
rewards? Or, to refine that slightly: if publishing simply involves collecting journal
articles (and other contributions to knowledge) in one place and distributing them
(digitally, perhaps), how can it be that publishers get such large rents?
Indeed, a preliminary question is whether publishers do get large rents. One way to
think about this is to look at the market value of such publishers. A leading example
is Reed Elsevier, which is currently valued in excess of US$60 billion, and has
performed strongly in recent years, despite the advent of the open-access debate.
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This is one example, but there are many. The question then is what value such
publishers add?
There are three possibilities. One is that publishers have monopoly power. They
set price above marginal cost, leading to higher prices and lower quantities
than is socially optimal. The second possibility is that publishers earn a return
commensurate with their marginal product, in the traditional economic sense.
Publishing requires financial capital, marketing, distribution, and so on. Perhaps
these activities are very valuable. With academic contributing their labor for free,
publishers perhaps simply reap the total rewards from valuable production of
knowledge.
A third possibility is that publishers play a coordinating role – akin to what Robert
Akerlof and I have dubbed “Movers and Shakers”. Our theory emphasizes the
potentially outsize returns that can be earned by agents that coordinate economic
activity – particularly by being central in a network. A lot has to come together to
publish high-quality journal articles month after month. The journal must be seen as
prestigious, the editors must be high quality, referees must submit useful and timely
reports, and so on.
One thing the Akerlof-Holden framework makes clear is that even if all the agents in
a network are ex ante identical, one agent emerges as the centrally-connected agent
who earns a rent for their position. In equilibrium this agent plays a valuable role,
but ex ante any of the agents could end up being the “mover and shaker”. In other
words, maybe prestigious journals controlled by certain publishers play a valuable
role ex post – but their existence is a matter of luck.
This squarely raises the question of whether the market could be re-designed
to deliver a different equilibrium outcome – perhaps with less market power for
particular players.
Designing knowledge markets
Let us begin with current proposals for open access. There are two main variants.
So-called “gold old open access” involves a journal’s papers being freely available,
with fees from authors funding the journal. Under “hybrid open access”, openness
is determined at the article level. Journals give authors the option of publishing
their paper with an “open access license” which means that readers pay no fees to
access it.
How would gold open access at top-ranked journals come about? This would require
all authors to pay fees to journals. Would those fees be modest or large? The current
operation of hybrid open access provides some clues.
A more practical question is how hybrid open access works. Here authors are given
the opportunity to pay for open access of their accepted article. This routinely runs
into several thousands of dollars per article. It is unclear what incentive individual
authors have to do this, but if they do the proceeds simply flow to the publisher.
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From an economic perspective this is nothing more than the publisher exercising
their market power of a different side of the market. Where once they extracted rents
from readers (especially and including libraries), now they extract rents from authors.
Worse, still, some authors are required by their funders to pay for open access. This
is true of various private foundations, as well as a number of government funding
bodies. Again, the current equilibrium in this market is for very large fees to be paid.
It is clear that publishers expect funders to simply “add on” the publication fees to
the research grants they are providing eventual authors. This is not “free”. This is
research funding that could otherwise be usefully spend doing research that is being
diverted to publishing research.
I share the view of Joshua Gans (p. 14) that “the activist movements to counter
publishers’ market power have been unsuccessful” and that reforming the knowledge
ecosystem will require much more dramatic efforts. As Gans puts it: “rather than
opening access to journals, I believe that scholarly publishing reform should focus on
disseminating the knowledge contained within them.”
The big question is what that looks like. I don’t know the answer but let me sketch an
intriguing possibility. Can publishing be fully decentralized using some of the lessons
from – and perhaps technologies of – blockchain/distributed ledgers?
Imagine a pool of scholars who are jointly the authors, referees, and editors involved
in the top journals in their field. Imagine these scholars commit to use tokens to
“pay” referees on this platform. These tokens can only be used on this publication
platform. A token earnt as a referee can be used as a publication fee (and perhaps
submission fee). Publication is all digital, and thus the typesetting and other
expenses are modest. Authors may need to pay an entry/annual fee (in cash, and
presumably from their research budgets) to fund the third parties who typeset the
papers and run the website disseminating them.
If many of the top scholars in a field were part of this ecosystem it would, by
definition, be prestigious to publish in that ecosystem. Could current journals sustain
their reputation as being “the best” in light of that? I conjecture that at a minimum
there is an equilibrium in which that reputation is not sustained, and we move to a
new equilibrium where scholars, in a decentralized fashion, control knowledge.
This is a version of the “distributed access” model of which Gans speaks in his
monograph and of which there have been initial forays.
To me, this fulfills the aspirations of “pure open access”. The existing models
of “gold” or “hybrid” seem like pale imitations of it where publishers simply use
their market power to extract rents from different sides of the market, but nothing
fundamentally changes.
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